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Abstract
In the past,rate of return regulation served to the ad
vantage of electric utility stockholders.
Today this is
no longer the case.
Furthermore, owners cannot assume
that utility management can or will work totally in their
behalf.
As a result, this paper presents as its main
thesis that utility stockholders should band together in
to advocacy groups to support their right to a fair rate
of return.

During the 1950's and much of the 1960's most,

was no longer as usual.

if not all, electric utilities, investors in

1973-74 with the oil embargo (and the subse

electric utility stocks, and consumers of
electricity enjoyed considerable economic and

quent quadrupling of oil prices), the precipi
tous increases in the cost of capital, and

financial benefits.

Change accelerated in

A significant number of

general uncertainties overall in the stability

electric utilities were considered as growth
companies and their common stock was treated

of the United States economy. Many more util
ities were captured by this second phase of

*8 an investment medium with the best of all
Possible worlds:
a low level of risk (a

financial problems.

The balance of the 1970's

was a third phase in which capital costs re
mained high, inflation remained high, fuel

table investment for widows and orphans) ,
s competitive yield with a satisfactory re
turn on investment and a substantial poten
tial for capital appreciation. This came
*bout for three reasons:

costs continued to escalate, and utilities in
creasingly ran into construction problems for
all of the reasons just listed as well as the
impact of price elasticity. Loads and energy

(1)
(2)

economies of scale^
low inflation

(3)

rate of return regulation

sales no longer grew at 5-8%, but now were
growing, if at all, at only a few percent for
most utilities.

The decade of the 1960's was one of change

Thus, from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's a

and the electric utility industry did not es
cape from its impact.

reversal took place.
Investors began shying
away from electric utility common stocks. No

■any utilities - a phase in which business

longer were they a safe haven with little
risk.
Indeed, quite the contrary was true.

The late 1960's saw
th e first phase of financial problems for
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When the Consolidated Edison company passed,

on stock holders' equity causes stock to sell

rather than issued, its dividend in early
1974, its stock dropped rapidly from about
$21.50 per share to below $10.00 per share.

at below book value and brings about a confis
cation of stockholders' equity.
In essence,
this is a transfer from the owners of the
2

The rest of the industry was soon to follow.
Thus, electric utility common stock became an
investment which could no longer be consider

utility to the consumers of the utility.

ed as low risk. Yields, corresponding to the
lower prices for stock, increased signifi

return the regulator is holding down the cost
to the consumer.
If the return is not fair
there is a transfer from the owner to the con

Since the return to the owners is considered
a cost in regulatory matters, by holding down

cantly to be competitive with bond yields.3
Finally, the prices for common stock have
continued in a general decline since the late
1960's; they are currently at historical lows

sumer since the consumer is not paying all of
the cost. This becomes a problem for the con
sumer over the long run. Diluted equity po

vis-a-vis the past fifteen years with the ex
ception of the 1974-75 period. Today, there

sitions and inadequate rate of return cause
utility financial risk to increase. As a re

are few individuals that would expound on the
possibility of electric utility common stocks
as an area with a potential capital apprecia
tion.
sons :

sult, financial instruments get downgraded by
rating agencies and the cost of new financing
goes up. So, sooner or later and one way or
the other the consumers pay.

All of this came about for three rea

(1)
(2)

diseconomies of scale^
high inflation

(3)

rate of return regulation

Though there are those who would debate the
point, it is this author's belief that regu
latory commissions have been lax in their
challenge to allow electric utilities to earn
a "fair rate of return". Many problems have

Regulation can do little, if anything, to al
leviate the problems of economies/diseconomies of scale. Regulation can do nothing to

caused this. Prominent among them are the
economic problems previously cited. But
there are two additional closely-related as

alleviate the problems of inflation. Whereas
rate of return regulation served, in a sense,
as a boon to utility common stock investors

pects.

up until the late 1960's, it has now perhaps
become the bane. A major problem brought

utility commissioner. Many are elected. As
such they hold a political position. But,

forth by rate of return regulation is, most
notably, regulatory lag. This, combined with
the problems of high interest rates, escalat
ing fuel prices, heavy construction expendi

even where appointed> rather than elected,
their position is still very political in na
ture.

tures, and diseconomies of scale has led to
the problem of dilution of stockholders'
equity.

First is the growing influence of

consumer groups who allegedly speak for and
represent residential customers. An addi
tional problem is the role of the public

This is very simply explained for two

reasons. First, and foremost, the majority
of the customers of a utility are residen
tial. Thus, a great deal of weight, in terms

Today the average electric utility

stock sells with an average market-to-bookratio of approximately 75%.** Whose problem is
this? Unfortunately, it is everyone's - at
least it is a problem for those who matter;
the utility's consumers and the utility's
owners. When a regulatory commission does
not allow an adequate rate of return, a
utility stock tends to drop in price to cor
rect for this. New stock issues tend to

of numbers, probably tends to influence regu
lators to lower rates of return. The second
problem comes about because of a dichotomy.
While utility investments are for the long
term utility commissioners usually hold posi
tions for a short term.^ A decision which
could hold costs down in the short run at the
expense of the long run could be made to pla"
cate the desires of residential customers.

drive the price down further unless an ade
quate return is allowed. Inadequate return
97

A final problem needs to be briefly address
ed.

TABLE 1

When a public service commission issues

Us

Them

o XYZ Utility

a revenue related order it will make a glow

o Regulatory Commission

ing statement that XYZ utility is authorized,

o Regulatory Commission
Staff

based upon its finding of fact and opinion,
to an allowed return of A % .
utilities will earn A % .

o Attorney General

However, few

o Public Advocate

Recently, many util

o Public Interest Re
search Group

ities have been authorized returns to stock
holders of 13-15%.

However, actual return

has only been about 11-12%.

On many occasions industrial intervenors are

In this type of
g

parties to a rate proceeding.

game there's no playing catchup.

Generally,

their position tends to be sympathetic to the
What then can be done to alleviate these pro
blems?

utility's in terms of the utility's requested

The balance of this paper will ad

dress a recommendation.

return on common equity.

In order for utility

Their main concern

is with cost allocations and rate structures.

shareholders to insure that their property is
not confiscated, that is in order for them to

Because of the pragmatic push-pull of regula

get adequate compensation for their invest

tion, a utility may sometimes compromise its

ment through a "fair rate of return", this
group needs to get organized.

desires just to get a rate increase into ef

Shareholders

fect.

should form advocacy groups and become an ac-

is the issue of the allowable return on com

q

five party in regulatory matters.

In the

mon equity.

past, the utility's owners have not been ac

Since, in most cases, the actual

owners of the utility are not participants in

tive participants in the regulatory process.

a rate case they have no voice.11 SHARE would

Rather, they have left such matters in the
hands of utility managers.

One of the major areas of compromise

help to alleviate this problem and more even

As will be seen

ly distribute the input to a rate proceeding

in the balance of this paper it is, in my

by adding another player to the "US" side of
12
the regulatory game.
Shareholder advocacy

opinion, time for this to change.

groups have been formed in several areas of

Shareholders Advocacy Group for Regulatory
Expediency:

the United States; Table 2 presents a summary

SHARE

of some of these groups.
these organizations?

How effective are

Since they are such a

Until the late 1960's to early 1970's many

new phenomenon it is hard to judge their

Vilifies faced rate decreases as opposed to

overall impact.

r*te increases.

known.

Regulation was simpler then.

Stockholders were pleased with their invest®ent and its return. Management of utili
ses were happy since as they sold more

However, a few examples are

The original group (to this author's

knowledge) was the Stockholders Committee of
Utah Power and Light Company.

This group was

instrumental in a 1976 Utah Power and Light

energy,the price to everyone tended to de
cease.
As a result, there was little in
v e s t , in general, in regulatory matters.
Rate cases were less sophisticated than today

rate case in which the Utah Public Service
Commission granted the utility a 16% return
on common equity - a decision which was un
precedented for Utah Power and Light and the

Wlth regulatory commission induced rate de

electric utility industry in general at the

ceases (occas ionally requested by utili-

time.13 This group subsequently disbanded and

^ies) .

a state-wide utility stockholder group which

Today is a different story indeed.

Current rate cases involve many parties and

includes owners of shares of Utah Power and

kring about a great deal of interest.

Light,

From

utility's view point it may look like

Intermountain Fuel and Rocky Mountain

Bell has since been formed.

this:

This present

group was instrumental in Utah Power and
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TABLE 2
Utility Shareholder Advocacy Groups
Name or Affiliation

Organization: Statewide (S)
or Utility Specific (U)

Current
Status

Activity
Level

Association Concerned for Utility Stock
holders Equity (Illinois Power)

U

Disbanded

Active 1
case

Association of Detroit Edison Shareholders
(Detroit Edison)

U

Inactive

Unknown

Association of South Carolina E & G Company
Investors (South Carolina E & G Company)

U

Active

Unknown

Association of Utility Investors (Ohio)

S

Active

Unknown

California Association of Utility Shareholders
(California)

S

Active

Very
Active

Louisiana Utility Shareholders (Louisiana)

S

Inactive

Unknown

Madison G & E Company

U

Unknown

Unknown

New York

Unknown

Unknown

Unknown

Oklahoma Natural Gas Company (Oklahoma)

U

Concept
Under
Study

Southern Company

U

Being Con
sidered

Stockholders Committee of Utah P & L Company
(Utah and Idaho)

U

Disbanded

Active 1
case

Utility Shareholders Association of Utah

S

Active

Very
Active
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-

Light being authorized a 16.8% return on com-

buyers to invest in the companies, which were

.. in a recent. case.
1 4
mon equity

not earning returns equal to the going market

In general,

rate."

the management of a corporation

seeks to maximize stockholders'
among other corporate goals.

equity,

Have utilities shrugged off their responsibi

In the regula

lities to their owners?

tory climate this converts to a goal of at
taining the authorized rate of return allow
able by a public service commission.

A recent Wall Street Journal article stated

However,

that in "this year's first six months, 86

a public utility is also charged with a re

utilities filed for 108 rate hikes totaling

sponsibility, usually referred to as a public
service commitment or obligation,

$5.75 billion... By contrast,

to provide

Because of

prime rate hit 20%.

this bifurcated responsibility and in view of

Currently the prime is at

13.5%, corporate AAA bonds are 12.34%, and
18
corporate BAA bonds are 14.11%.
Yet at the

the problems portrayed at the beginning of
this paper, utility shareholders have simply
not been treated fairly.

in all of last

year, 61 utilities asked for $5.74 billion of
17
increases."
During April of this year the

service at the lowest possible cost given a
certain level of reliability.

Recent activity would

seem to indicate that this is not the case.

end of the second quarter return on common

Lucien Smartt, Edi

equity stands as follows for electric utili

tor of Public Utilities Fortnightly, in an

ties: 19

editorial entitled, "A Problem in Equity and
ROCE - %

a Proposed Solution" stated that:1
"Of the sixty-six electric utility stock of
ferings nationwide in 1979...all but six were
sold below book value and all sales to date
in 1980 have involved dilution.

None of the

one hundred largest investor-owned electric

Low

Composite

16.2

2.8

10.9

Utilities that Flow
Thru

14.5

6.0

11.2

Yet,rate increase requests aside,this data re

utility companies can presently sell shares

flects the fact that utility stockholders are

without diluting existing shareholders' in
vestment.

High
Utilities that
Normalize

not earning an adequate return vis-a-vis the

This situation has not caused

rates on long term debt instruments - espe

utilities to suspend sales of new common

cially in view of the fact that utility common

stock, however."

stock is the most risky of all financial in

Mr. Smartt's statement discusses in detail

struments included in a utility's capital

certain activities of the California Associa

structure.

tion of Utility Shareholders.

Regarding di

Thus in this author's view there is only one

lution he goes on to state that:1^
While this phenomenon is national,

resort for utility stockholders - form advo
the

cacy groups; intervene in rate cases and be an

shareholders of the major utilities operating

active participant; and if a public service

ln California have been particularly hard

commission does not allow an adequate return,
20
take it to court.
The corporation serving in

*t*

Since 1972, the five largest public

Ut^-llties in that state have sold over 115

a regulated environment must wear two hats si

®lUion shares

multaneously - serving its owners and its cus-

of new common stock.

Every

8lugle share has been sold below book value.

At*

tormers.

no time in the last seven years has a

Because of this and the other eco

nomic, financial, and regulatory problems im

^lifornia utility sold stock above book va-

pacting electric utilities, its owner cannot

lue- The 115 million shares were sold at an

sit idly - they must take action to ensure

a9gregate of $850 million below their book

fair treatment and a fair rate of return.

Value.

This means that existing shareholders

V,ere forced to give up that amount of their
lnvestment in the utilities to entice new
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